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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Aim of the thesis 
This thesis aims to elaborate on the issue of applying current possible exception clauses to 
alleged unlawful export restrictions, in accordance with present articles under GATT 1994 and 
available case laws. Meanwhile, a highly relevant case China  Rare Earths would be dis-
cussed in light of this. 
In recent years, the proliferation of natural resource trade1 has caused rising demand in supply 
of resource products, leading to “widespread anxiety over the security of access to natural re-
source.”2 In context of this, export restrictions have been frequently imposed on resource 
products, most of which come from the developing world.3  
Recently, known as China  Rare Earths, a case against China’s measures related to the ex-
portation of rare earths was brought to WTO and a panel has been established by request of 
Japan, which is the complainant, and later joined by European Union, United States as well as 
other countries and areas4. It is another sign for the increasingly heated topic of export restric-
tions during recent decades subsequent to the high profile case China  Raw Materials, in 
                                                 
 
1 According to the WTO Trade Report of 2010, “natural resources represent a significant and 
growing share of world trade and amounted to some 24 percent of total merchandise trade in 
2008.” The volume of the trade has been steady while the value “has grown annually at 20 
percent” over the past decade. See WTO (2010) p.40. 
2 Qin (2012) p.6 
3 For example, according to the statistics, during 2003-2009, export duties were mainly im-
posed by developing and least developed countries. se Kim (2010) p.7 
4 WTO (2012)a  
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which WTO’s Appellate Body just ruled that China violated WTO rules and its accession pro-
tocol by imposing export restrictions on certain raw materials.5  
Against this backdrop, it is thus vital for exporting countries to seek justifications provided in 
GATT/WTO when facing challenges to their export restrictions. In this thesis, difficulties in 
applying the exceptions would be identified. In addition, specific situations of China  Rare 
Earths are taken into consideration. 
 
1.2 A big picture: natural resource trade 
Export restrictions in China  Rare Earths are imposed on natural resource. Natural resources 
are both essential to the production process and actually or potentially exhaustible, which 
present particular challenges for the policy-makers. The exploitation must keep a balance be-
tween the current needs and that of future generations. Moreover, because of the unequal dis-
tribution of various natural resources, market prices may show great volatility.6 Both of the 
developed world and developing countries are prone to be negatively influenced by the price 
fluctuation, especially the developing countries that are highly dependent on the export of nat-
ural resources.7  
From the perspective of historical development, GATT was never designed to be a forum for 
natural resource trade, or developing countries’ participation. To the contrary, it “had always 
been an instrument for pursuing the trade objectives of the leading industrial states”.8 In fact, 
developing countries hardly participated in negotiations until the Uruguay Round. Most of 
them were not members back then.9 While at the same time, the GATT was utilized “as a me-
                                                 
 
5 ICTSD (2012)a p.1  
6 WTO (2010) p.163 
7 WTO (2010) p.163 
8 See Rorden (2008) p.479. The primary focus of WTO/GATT rules was not for natural re-
sources trade. Rules related to it are either problematic or not enough to cover all aspects of 
natural resources trade’s policy realities. See WTO (2010) p.4. 
9 Moore (2001) 
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chanism for facilitating an increase in the volume and value of trade among the industrial 
states in manufactures, semi-manufactures, and capital goods.”10 Natural resources trade, or 
primary commodities were not listed among them.  
World trade report of 2010, drafted by WTO, featured the topic of “trade in natural resources”. 
It pointed out that, in the recent decades, commodity-importing countries have begun to con-
cern about the rising resources prices, as well as the increasing restrictions imposed on raw 
materials export. This has become the focus of current discussion surrounding natural re-
sources trade under the framework of GATT/WTO.11 The fact is strongly supported by statis-
tics.12 
 
1.3 Connotation of “export restrictions” in this thesis 
As early as 1920s and 1930s, price slump in commodity market led to a series of International 
Commodity Agreements (ICAs), which “aimed at stabilizing prices by controlling quantities 
produced and sold.”13 Export restrictions schemes were listed among its various creations. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that they should be imposed on the basis of mutual interest and 
consent of producer and consumer.  
After entering GATT era, 1960s and 1970s have seen a trend within the group of developing 
countries’ that, in terms of export restrictions provisions, state sovereignty over the natural 
resources should be emphasized.14 Thus, exporting countries should be free to decide their 
                                                 
 
10 Rorden (2008) p.487 
11 WTO (2010) p.164 
12 According to the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews, “export taxes on natural resources appear 
twice as likely as export taxes in other sectors.” The situation remains the same in a larger 
scope. It is reported that, export restrictions on natural resource products accounted for a large 
share among all notified export restrictions, which was some 2,577 entries out of a total of 
7,328. See WTO (2010) p.119. 
13 WTO (2010), p.163 
14 For example, according to a statement submitted by the delegation of India in a Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations Group Meeting, “two of the guiding principles” in export restrictions pro-
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export policies on natural resources, and ensure domestic supply in the first place. However, in 
recent decades, discussions in the field of natural resources trade have centered around the 
worries of importing countries, that “rising resource prices and signs of increasing restrictions 
on the export of raw materials”15. Unfortunately, the issue of export restrictions did not man-
age to be brought into the negotiation of Uruguay Round.16 
 
1.3.1 Definition 
Although Article XI of GATT 1994 does not deal with export restrictions exclusively, it con-
tains the most important rules on export restrictions in context of GATT/WTO. 
From its text, expressions such as “duties, taxes” and “quotas”, “export licenses or other 
measures” can be found17. However, so far there has not been any WTO document giving an 
official definition on “export restrictions”.  
It was once mentioned in a WTO discussion paper that, “there are various forms of export 
restrictions. These include export taxes, export bans, regulated exports, supervised exports…. 
Regulated exports include quotas and licensing requirements.”18 Similar illustrations can also 
be found in other authorities.19  
Export duties are the main form of export restrictions which are not prohibited by WTO rules. 
Thus they become preferred and widely used instruments for exporting countries to impose 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
visions would be “the sovereignty of States over their natural resources and the need for de-
veloping countries to utilize their resources and the need for developing countries to utilize 
their development in the most optimal manner…”. “Supplies to domestic industries” should be 
prioritized. See GATT (1979) and Qin (2012) p.5. 
15 WTO (2010), p.164 
16 WTO (2010), p.164 
17 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1807 
18 Piermartini (2004) p.3 
19 Korinek and Kim (2011) p.256. See also Kim (2010) p.2. 
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export restriction policies. It is said that in 2004, about one third of WTO Members impose 
export duties on some products.20 
 
1.3.2 Implementation of export restrictions 
According to the statistics of WTO, there were in total 7,328 entries of export restrictions noti-
fied to WTO.21 Countries often utilize export restrictions for strategic purposes. WTO once 
elaborated the issue as follows: “governments may use export taxes and restrictions for a va-
riety of reasons, including economic diversification and domestic price stabilization, to coun-
ter escalating tariffs in importing countries and to manage environmental externalities.”22 Part-
ly because of the empty space left by drafters, it is true that a number of social, economic ob-
jectives would become the motivation for policy makers to impose export restrictions. Moreo-
ver, among them, environmental related reason is the most frequently cited.23  
However, export restrictions are not considered as the most effective way to fulfill certain pol-
icy purposes, for example, “distributional and environmental policy objectives”.24 Just like 
what WTO expressed in China’s Trade Policy Review (TPR), export restraints “may not be 
the best way” to achieve some of the country’s rationale, such as environmental protection, 
conservation of natural resources, especially those that were imposed on “some highly pollut-
ing or high-energy consuming products.”25 
 
                                                 
 
20 Piermartini (2004) p.2. See also Barfield (2008). 
21 Export duties are not included in these entries. See WTO (2010) p.119. 
22 WTO (2010) p.4 
23 Korinek and Kim (2011) p.264. In fact, as early as the GATT era, export restrictions have 
been identified as one sort of measures taken on environmental grounds that would have im-
pact on international trade directly or indirectly. See GATT (1991) p.36. 
24 Karapina (2012) p.444 
25 WTO Secretariat (2010) p.44 
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1.3.3 Justifications for export restrictions 
Considering the possible negative results export restrictions may lead to, their application is 
limited to certain situations where they are rendered as lawful measures. Apart from export 
duties which are originally not in violation of GATT 1994, other quantitative restrictions, such 
as export quotas, export bans, export licensing and so on can only be justified under certain 
circumstances.  
One of the exceptions can be found in Art. XI. According to Art. XI:2(a), WTO-legal export 
restrictions can be “temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortage of foodstuffs or 
other products essential to the exporting contracting parties.”26  
General exceptions provided in Art. XX can also be referred to as alternative justifications for 
export restrictions. Art. XX lists various policy objectives, for example, public order and envi-
ronmental considerations, under which the measures in violation of GATT can be justified. 
 
1.4 Scope of the thesis 
 
1.4.1 Preclusion of Voluntary Export Restrictions (VER) 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) is a form of export restriction in a wide scope. It is differ-
ent from so-called Initiative Export Restraints (IER), which falls into our discussion scope, in 
that it features the exporting country imposing the restraints unilaterally, and modifying or 
eliminating it technically. It is usually resulted from the negotiation between exporting coun-
tries and importing countries, and due to the pressure from an importing country.27 In essence, 
VERs is a kind of protectionism policy tools, proliferated under context of GATT, which 
                                                 
 
26 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1807 
27 Jones (1989) pp.125-126. A most leading example in this respect is the Automobile VER 
agreement concluded between U.S and Japan in 1981. According to the agreement, during a 
designated period, Japan had to limit its exports of passenger cars to U.S to a certain number. 
It was reinforced by U.S’ political pressure. See Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1999) p.400. 
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clearly restricts the use of trade restrictive measures, such as tariffs and quotas.28 During the 
Uruguay Round negotiation, the VER was explicitly prohibited in Agreement on Safeguards, 
by providing: “…a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, 
orderly market arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side…” 
in Art. 11:1(b).29 
Analysis on export restrictions in this thesis is centered on Art. XI of GATT 1994. The pur-
pose of the provision was to preclude countries from imposing export restrictive measures “in 
a discriminatory, quantitative manner, to the detriment of the targeted importing country”.30 
However, as noted above, from its nature, VER is an alternative measure adopted by import-
ing countries in purpose of protecting national industries, and takes the form of export restric-
tions imposed by exporting country initially. In this respect, application of this article to VER 
“would hold the victim of VER agreements (exporting country) guilty of the infraction, whe-
reas in reality it is the imposing country that is responsible for causing it.”31 The discussion on 
VER would go against the starting point of this thesis, which considers export restrictions as 
measures adopted by exporting countries pursuing their own policy objectives. VER is there-
fore not covered by this thesis. 
 
1.4.2 Preclusion of certain justifications 
Art. XI:2(b) of GATT 1994 stipulates that, export restrictions which are unlawful under 
GATT, can be justified if they are “necessary to the application of standards or regulations for 
                                                 
 
28 Jones (1989) p.127. According to the author, VERs is utilized by trade officials as “an alter-
native to the traditional instruments of trade control.” This caused the proliferation of VERs at 
the “pre-WTO era”. Particularly, the use of VERs by United States and the European Commu-
nity “has risen dramatically since the mid-1970s”. see Gu (2011) p.778 and Rosendorff (1996) 
p.544. 
29 Gu (2011) p.779 
30 Jones (1989) p.132 
31 Jones (1989) p.132 
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the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade” 32. However, the 
justification has never been cited in any GATT/WTO precedents, nor does it bear any relation 
to China  Rare Earths. Therefore it would be precluded from our discussion scope. 
Echoing Art. XI of GATT 1994, Art. 12 under Agreement of Agriculture restricts the applica-
tion of export restrictions in agricultural area, and provides exception for developing coun-
tries33. Given that Art. 12 has a rather limited application scope, it would not be discussed he-
reinafter. 
 
1.4.3 Preclusion of the accession protocol’s impact 
New members to WTO usually face harsher provisions on export restrictions. For example, 
China made such commitments in Art. 11.3 of Accession Protocol, promising that it would 
“eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 
of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 
1994.”34 In China  Raw Materials, after interpreting the language of this provision and its 
context, the Appellate Body held that, since Art. 11.3 of Accession Protocol did not refer to 
Art. XX of GATT 1994 expressly, China cannot make recourse to exceptions under Art. XX.35    
                                                 
 
32 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1807 
33 Relevant text of Art. 12 reads as follows:  
“…2. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member, unless 
the measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the spe-
cific foodstuff concerned.” see Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1843 
34 WTO Secretariat (2001). Similar provisions can also be found in other new members’ ac-
cession protocols. According to one report on the official website of Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry of Japan, these countries include Mongolia, Ukraine, Latvia, Albania, Sau-
di Arabia and so on. See Trade Policy Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of Japan 
(2012) pp.366-372 
35 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.307 
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Although the commitment made by new members in accession protocol would affect their 
rights to revoke exceptions in GATT/WTO to some extent, this thesis has no intention of ad-
dressing the relationship between member state’s accession protocol and WTO agreement. 
The discussion on available exceptions to export restrictions below is based on the analysis of 
relevant provisions in GATT/WTO as such. Accession protocol’s impact on the availability of 
exception provisions would thus be precluded. 
 
1.5 Methodologies 
Generally speaking, the thesis is carrying a case law approach. According to Art. 3.2 of Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), dispute 
settlement system of WTO serves “to clarify the existing provisions…in accordance with cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law.”36 Practices play an important rule in 
GATT/WTO context. Thus, it is necessary to refer to GATT/WTO cases when illustrating the 
exact rights and obligations provided in provisions. 
The aim of the thesis is to discuss provisions on exceptions to export restrictions in GATT 
1994, and their application in to China  Rare Earths. In light of this, certain pertinent cases 
under GATT/WTO framework are examined to help interpret key elements of relevant provi-
sions. Particularly, among these case, China  Raw Materials is most similar and relevant to 
China  Rare Earths, thus would be elaborated in detail. Apart from cases, historical back-
ground is also taken into consideration in order to provide a deep understanding.  
China  Rare Earths is picked as the case for demonstrating the application of exceptions to 
export restrictions in context of natural resources trade, for it is a newly filed case in this hot 
debated area. In addition, since the case involves many developed countries’ importing inter-
ests in rare earths market, it has drawn much attention worldwide. Discussion of China  Rare 
Earths would be restricted to scope indicated in this chapter, using analysis based on case law 
research. By way of illustrating standards indicated by legal texts, possibilities of utilizing 
available exception provisions on export restrictions would be evaluated. Meanwhile, unique 
                                                 
 
36 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1949 
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features of China  Rare Earths are also presented, and impact of these features would be re-
vealed thereby. 
 
1.6 Overview of the thesis 
Followed by introduction of the thesis, China  Rare Earths is presented in the first place, 
including background introduction and basic facts. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on excep-
tions provided in Art. XI:2(a) and Art. XX respectively.  Both chapters constitute several parts 
elaborating on crucial elements of these two provisions, supported by GATT/WTO precedents. 
At the end of every part, China  Rare Earths would be discussed in light of its unique situa-
tions. Finally, conclusion would be given. 
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2 New case concerning export restrictions: China  Rare Earths 
 
2.1 Brief introduction to the case 
 
In March 2012, three countries filed a new case related to China’s various export restrictions 
on export of certain forms of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum.37 The so-called “China  
Rare Earths” is still in progress, and has already caught much public attention. In terms of the 
complaints (e.g. the measures being challenged), the case seems much the same with the Chi-
na  Raw Materials, of which the Appellate Body Report was adopted in January 2012.  
Similarities can be found in China  Raw Materials and China  Rare Earths. Firstly, the 
challenged export restrictions are both imposed on natural resources. Secondly, both cases 
have implications in aspects of environmental protection and natural resource conservation. 
China failed the first case, and was denied by Appellate Body of its attempt to apply various 
justifications. However, considering the new changes occurred in China’s legislation area, 
which put great emphasis on environmental considerations as well as conserving domestic rare 
earths resource, China  Rare Earths may have a different result. It is highly expected that 
China  Rare Earths would again intensify WTO practice and show flexibility on export re-
strictions.  
China  Rare Earths reflects hot issues in international trade nowadays. It can be a good dem-
onstration of how exceptions can be applied to export restrictions in natural resource trade area, 
and how environment considerations as well as other policy objectives reflected in these ex-
port restrictions should be dealt with. Considering there have not been so many cases address
                                                 
 
37 WTO (2012)a 
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ing the issue of export restrictions, especially those imposed on natural resources38, much 
room is left for discussion in China  Rare Earths. 
 
2.2 Basic facts 
 
2.2.1 Rare earths in general 
Among the three natural resources involved in China  Rare Earths, rare earths are of the 
most concern to importing countries. Rare earths are a group of 17 chemical elements in the 
periodic table of the elements, and basically divided into three different groups: light, middle 
and heavy based on their atomic weights and physicochemical properties.39  
Rare earths have a wide scope of application in industries. They are essential in the area of 
small sized technology application, for example, cell phone, laptop computer. At the same 
time, they can be utilized in the defense industry, including radar systems and reactive armor. 
Moreover, they are also crucial to the improvement of green technology, such as wind po-
wered turbines and plug-in hybrid vehicles, etc.40 Thus, rare earths have strategic meaning to 
countries in a way.  
Pollution problem in rare earths industry is another fact worth mentioning. It is widely ac-
cepted that the exploitation process of rare earths can be quite contaminable per se. The pro-
duction of every ton of rare earths would generate approximately 8.5 kilograms fluorine and 
                                                 
 
38 See Karapinar (2012) pp.443-479. According to the author, up until now, there have been 5 
cases concerning export restrictions, including 1 voluntary export restriction complaint, which 
has already been excluded from discussion scope of this thesis. (See 1.4.1)  
39 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012). Another version of the rare earth 
story can be found in Long (2010). According to the report, the rare earth elements are com-
posed of 15 elements, and can be divided into two different groups: heavy and light. 
40 Hurst (2010) p.3. For example, EU is highly dependent on the “high tech” metals like rare 
earths. They render that these metals are crucial and necessary to their environmental technol-
ogy’s development. See Commission of the European Communities (2008) p.2. 
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13 kilograms dust. Using concentrated sulfuric acid high temperature calcination techniques to 
produce approximately one ton calcined rare earths ore would generate 9,600 to 12,000 cubic 
meters of waste gas which contains dust concentrate, hydrofluoric acid, sulfur dioxide, and 
sulfuric acid, around 75 cubic meters of acidic wastewater, as well as about one ton of radioac-
tive waste residue (water contained).41 These facts make environmental implication a salient 
character of rare earths issues.    
 
2.2.2 China’s export policies on rare earths 
China’s rare earth reserves take up about 23 percent for the world’s total.42 However, at the 
same time, China provides approximately 97 percent of the world’s total production,43 which 
makes it the world’s largest exporter of rare earths.44 This fact leads to the world’s close con-
cern about China’s export policies on rare earths.45 
According to the description in China’s Trade Policy Review, generally speaking, China’s 
export regime “is still characterized by various restrictions, notably prohibitions, licensing, 
quotas, taxes, and less than full rebates of VAT on exports.” However, the Trade Policy Re-
view also listed the officially stated objectives that the measures serve, such as protecting the 
                                                 
 
41 Chinese Society of Rare Earths (2009) and Hurst (2010) p.16 
42 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012). However, according to Long 
(2010), China accounts for 36 percent of identified world reserves. Meanwhile, U.S.’s deposits 
together with China “comprise the largest percentage of economic rare earth resources.” See 
Hurst (2010) p.4. 
43 Long (2010), see also Korinek and Kim (2011) p.264. 
44 Meanwhile, China is considered to be the world’s largest producer and consumer of rare 
earth products. See Information Office of the State Council of China (2012). 
45 For example, US now obtain almost rare earths elements exclusively from China. This 
brings the fear that this dependence would lead to supply security issues. See Long (2010). In 
fact, China’s status as “a major producer, consumer and trader of many commodities that are 
strategically important for global supply chains” makes its export restrictions probable to 
“have substantial consequences for global welfare”. See Karapinar (2011) p.390. 
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environment, conserving natural resources and ensuring stable domestic supply, and pointed 
out the ineffectiveness of the restriction measures.46    
Since the introduction of rare earths’ export quota system, China has implemented a series of 
measures clamping down the rare earths export: VAT refund on exports was cancelled in 2005; 
the Ministry of Land and Resources began to stop issuing exploitation permit in 2006, mean-
ing an increasing control on “exploitation, processing and export” of rare earths; 2009-2015 
Rare Earths Industry Development Plan was released in 2009, pointing out that the export 
quota would be restricted in future years.47 
 
2.3 Measures in dispute 
In China-Rare Earths, the 3 complaints accused China of imposing export restrictions on vari-
ous forms of rare earths, which include export duties, export quotas, minimum export price 
requirements, export licensing requirements and additional requirements and procedures re-
lated to the administration of the quantitative restrictions.48  
China’s export quota on rare earths was introduced in 2005. Between 2005 and 2011, the ex-
port of rare earths fell by over 50%.49 The quota is allocated to domestic firms and joint ven-
tures with foreign investors. Only joint ventures with export licensing are allowed to export 
rare earths to global market, which leads to another export restriction, i.e. export licensing. 
Both domestic companies and joint ventures need to get export licensing in order to engage in 
rare earths export. China has gradually reduced the number of licensed companies in recent 
years. During the last 6 years, total number of companies that received export licenses reduced 
from 59 to 31.50 The two kinds of export restrictions are both issued by Ministry of Commerce 
in China. Considering they function much the same, and export quota is the one which is de-
                                                 
 
46 WTO Secretariat (2010) p.44 
47 Li (2011) 
48 WTO (2012)a 
49 Humphries (2012) p.19 
50 Morrison and Tang (2012) p.16 
 15 
bated on from time to time, discussion in this thesis would mainly focus on export quota im-
posed on rare earths.   
For a long time, China’s export restrictions on rare earths have been accused of being used as 
a policy tool to favor domestic industries. European Union criticized China’s export measures 
as “causing distortions in the market and placing foreign products that rely on rare earth ele-
ments in an extremely disadvantageous position.”51 Additionally, it was pointed out that, Chi-
na’s export restriction policies have been put into place to encourage downstream industries 
that produce goods with higher value added to locate in China, and reserve rare earths re-
sources for domestic manufacturing industry.52  
Similar wordings can be found in China-Rare Earths. In its request for consultations, Japan 
alleged that, “China imposes additional requirements and procedures in connection with the 
administration of the quantitative restrictions on various forms of rare earths, tungsten and 
molybdenum…that appear to treat foreign-invested entities differently from domestic enti-
ties.”53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
51 Trade Policy Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of Japan (2012) pp.380-381 
52 Korinek and Kim (2011) pp.271, Gu (2011) p.775 
53 Japan (2012)  
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3 An analysis on Art. XI of GATT 1994 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
3.1.1 General prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
As can be seen from the title of Art. XI (i.e. “General Elimination of Quantitative Restric-
tions”54) and the text of Art. XI:1, quantitative prohibitions and restrictions are in principle 
prohibited, no matter export or import. Further, Appellate Body in China  Raw Materials 
pointed out the prohibitions and restrictions cover those “that have a limiting effect on the 
quantity or amount of a product being imported or exported.”55 
According to Art. XI:1, export duties are the only lawful form of export restriction. It is in 
conformity with one basic principle of the GATT system, that “tariffs are the preferred and 
acceptable form of protection.”56 However, unlike various binding import tariff commitments, 
there’s no general framework for negotiating export duties.57 It is thus considered that, Art. 
XI:1 can be “read positively” as allowing members to impose restrictions by way of duties, 
taxes or other charges.58  
                                                 
 
54 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1807 
55 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.320 
56 Appellate Body Report, Turkey  Textiles, para.9.63 
57 Export duty commitments can only be found in individual cases. For example, Australia 
made commitments of not imposing export duty on certain product in 1994. New WTO mem-
bers were also required to make accession commitments on export duties, such as China. See 
Qin (2012) pp.6-7 and 1.4.3 above.  
58 Crosby (2008) p.3, Bouët and Laborde Debucquet (2012) p.210 
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Export duties have similar effect to other export restrictions. Given the fact that export restric-
tions other than export duties are generally prohibited, and there exists no binding and inte-
grated framework for export duties at the same time, countries that intend to impose restric-
tions on export can easily turn to resort to export duties. In light of this, WTO rules on export 
restrictions are largely rendered to be imprudent and ineffective, and referred as an area “of 
under-regulation”.59 
 
3.1.2 Exception provisions 
Art. XI: 2(a) constitutes one of the justifications to WTO-illegal export restriction. Sections 
below would focus on elaborating this exception. The issue would be spelled out in close con-
nection with China  Raw Materials, because it was the first time for WTO’s adjudicative 
bodies to address the provision.60 The reasoning in this case may have a strong impact on 
another highly similar case in process now, i.e. China  Rare Earths. Additionally, as indi-
cated in the beginning of the thesis, the discussion would center around the provision’s impli-
cation of natural resource.  
Art. XI:2(a) is also closely linked with certain subsections under Art. XX of GATT 1994. 
Firstly, from the text, both Art. XX(j) and Art. XI:2(a) address the exception applied under 
circumstances of products’ shortages61, which can be reflected in similar wordings in terms of 
                                                 
 
59 Qin (2012) pp.4-5, Karapinar (2012) p.443  
60 ICTSD (2012)a p.2 
61 Art. XI:2(a) stipulates that: 
“…Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical short-
ages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.” Global and 
Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1807 
Text of Art. XX(j) reads as follows: 
“Article XX: General Exceptions 
… 
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short supply, the essentialness as well as the temporariness62 of the measures in dispute. Se-
condly, it can be seen from the Panel Report of China  Raw Materials, that WTO adjudica-
tors also tend to link the provision with Art. XX(g), in that both of them can be invoked by the 
exporting country on matters related to exhaustible natural resources.  
 
3.2 Analysis on Art. XI:2(a) 
Effective treaty interpretation was referred to as the “general rule of interpretation” by Appel-
late Body. According to the principle, the interpretation must give meaning and effect to all 
terms of a treaty, and should not cause the whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to be redun-
dant.63 In consideration of this, both being exceptions to quantitative restrictions, Art. XI:2(a) 
and Art. XX must set different conditions for application respectively, even though similar 
wordings can be found in the texts. These wordings must be empowered different connotations, 
or else it would cause either of the two articles superfluous.  
The sections below would shed light on critical wordings in Art. XI:2(a), while referring to the 
recently resolved China  Raw Materials. In context of this, China  Rare Earths would be 
analyzed, and evaluated against the standards indicated by these wordings.  
                                                                                                                                                         
 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Pro-
vided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties 
are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any 
such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be 
discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. …” See Global 
and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1818. 
62 Certain sentences found in Art. XX(j), such as “…any such measures,…shall be discontin-
ued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist” seem to express the 
same meaning as “temporarily” in Art. XI:2(a). See Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) 
p.1818. 
63 Appellate Body Report, Japan  Alcoholic Beverages II, pp.17-18 and Appellate Body Re-
port, US  Gasoline, p.23  
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3.2.1 “essential to” 
From the perspective of negotiation history, the wording of “essential to the exporting coun-
try” was altered by the Preparatory Committee “to indicate…that…for the purposes of this 
provision the importance of any product should be judged in relation to the particular country 
concerned.”64 A case-by-case analysis is therefore favored when interpreting the essentiality of 
the measure at dispute.  
In China  Raw Materials, the Appellate Body started the interpretation by researching into 
the literal meaning of “essential”, and pointed out the “essential” products under Art. XI:2(a) 
are not limited to foodstuffs. “Foodstuffs or otherwise absolutely indispensable or necessary 
products” should all be included. 65 The Panel stated, “the determination of whether a product 
is ‘essential’ to that Member should take into consideration the particular circumstances faced 
by that Member at the time when a Member applies a restriction or prohibition under Article 
XI:2(a)”.66 Additionally, the Panel drew the conclusion that “a product that is an ‘input’ to an 
important product or industry” may fall into the scope of “essential” products.67 By applying 
this standard, the Panel was persuaded by China’s presented evidence that the raw materials in 
issue take important place in China’s related products’ market.  
However, neither Appellate Body nor the Panel managed to give guiding opinions on interpre-
tation of “essential”. Although “input to an important product” was included in the scope of 
“essential” products, the Panel seemed to address the issue in a narrow context of industrial 
production. In addition, the reading would be more instructive if quantitative and more specif-
ic standards could be established instead of abstract descriptions such as “indispensable” and 
“necessary”.68  
Like China  Raw Materials, rare earths may also be confirmed as essential products in Chi-
na-Rare Earths. Apart from the similarities in properties, as mentioned above, rare earths have 
                                                 
 
64 WTO (2012)b p.326  
65 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.326 
66 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.276 
67 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.282 
68 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.326 
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strategic meaning, and can be widely applied in high technology products. Following the rea-
soning in China  Raw Materials, if rare earths can be proved to be “input to an important 
product or industry”, it is highly probable for them to be recognized as essential products. As 
mentioned above in Chapter 2, rare earths are widely applied in various industries. For exam-
ple, they can be used to make metal alloys in connection with cars manufacturing industry, as 
well as magnets widely used in a long list of electronic appliances. Considering their econom-
ic contributions made to GDP, it is fair to say manufacturing industries enjoy important status 
in China. 69 
To sum up, judging from the texts and practices, rare earths account for a necessary part of 
China’s important industries, making them qualified for the standard of “essential”. 
 
3.2.2 “critical shortage” 
The Appellate Body of China  Raw Materials read “critical shortage” as crucial deficiencies, 
which “amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important or deci-
sive stage, or a turning point” by way of literal interpretation.70 After comparing to “in short 
supply” adopted in Art. XX(j), the Appellate Body made clear that “critical shortage” of Art. 
XI:2(a) actually implied a narrower scope of application. The Appellate Body also put empha-
sis on the nexus between different terms, while stating that whether the shortage of certain 
product is “critical” or not should be “informed by” the essentiality of this product.71 Similarly, 
the Panel opined that, “critical” shows that “a shortage must be of ‘decisive importance’ or 
‘grave’, or even rising to the level of a ‘crisis’ or ‘catastrophe’.” Meanwhile, the measures in 
dispute must be applied in a “temporary” manner, which at the same time “informs the notion 
of ‘critical shortage’.”72  
                                                 
 
69 It is reported that, China industries contributed more than 40% to GDP during 2004 and 
2010. See Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (2012). 
70 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.324 
71 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.328 
72 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.296-7.297 
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As the respondent, China argued that “Article XI:2(a) would permit long-term measures to be 
imposed to address an inevitable depletion of a finite resource.” However, the Panel showed 
its disagreement to this opinion.73 It also pointed out that, “if there is no possibility for an ex-
isting shortage ever to cease to exist, it will not be possible to ‘relieve or prevent’ it through an 
export restriction applied on a temporary basis.”74 In this sense, it seems the Panel has ruled 
out the possibility of applying Art. XI:2(a) to export restrictions imposed on natural resource. 
However, the Appellate Body made a clarification, stating that a measure under Art. XI:2(a) 
could address the purpose of critical shortage and natural resource conservation at the same 
time. An example of natural disaster was given on this point.75  
This interpretation approach of the Panel has been criticized for its restrictiveness, for it re-
ferred to the exhaustibility of natural resources as the reason why their critical shortage could 
not be “relieved” or “prevented” anyway.76 The Appellate Body also failed to take into con-
sideration characteristics pertaining to natural resources and did not address the standard in 
context of natural resources trade clearly. For example, utilization and accessibility of natural 
resources are subject to exploitation conditions and technologies to a large extent. Therefore, 
although natural resources usually have limited life span and would be depleted to a certain 
point, it does not necessarily mean that the situation of “critical shortage” will only appear 
when certain natural resource come to an exhaustion and cannot be prevented or relieved any-
how. To the contrary, natural resources are quite possibly to reach the level of “critical short-
age” if certain circumstances, for example, development of technologies or side effects caused 
by exploitation activities preclude countries from obtaining sufficient resources.  
                                                 
 
73 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.305. To help explain the issue, the Panel 
drew a line between Art. XX(g) and Art. XI:2(a). This issue would be addressed in 4.7. 
74 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.297 
75 The Appellate Body addressed the example as following: “…Article XI:2(a) measures could 
be imposed, for example, if a natural disaster caused a ‘critical shortage’ of an exhaustible 
natural resource, which, at the same time, constituted a foodstuff or other essential product.” 
See Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.337. 
76 Karapinar (2012), p.455 
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When it comes to China  Rare Earths, the core issue lies in whether or not shortage of rare 
earths materials has already reached the level of “critical”, and is able to be prevented or re-
lieved by export restrictions. According to remarks above, the fact that natural resources are of 
limited life span would not naturally mean the critical shortage of natural resources cannot be 
“prevented” or “relieved”. So the issues now remains if shortage of rare earths in China is a 
“critical” one. 
In line with the reasoning of China  Raw Materials, since rare earths are exhaustible natural 
resources, export restrictions related to them would cause an overlap between China’s inten-
tion of addressing critical shortage and conserving natural resources. Although this fact would 
not cause Art. XI:2(a) inapplicable directly, China still has to prove that concerning its impor-
tant status in rare earths supply market, the shortage of rare earths in China is a “critical” one.    
According to China’s official statements, although China accounts for 23% of the world’s rare 
earths reserve, excessive exploitation during the last 50 years has caused the reserves declining, 
especially in major mining areas. The years of guaranteed rare earth supply have also been 
reducing.77 In line with the reasoning of Appellate Body in China  Raw Materials, the essen-
tialness of rare earth would inform how critical the shortage is.78 Rare earths are critical raw 
materials and take an important place in value chain. Since its wide application in industrial 
area, a stable supply in rare earths is particularly vital to climate policy objectives and for 
technology innovation. What makes rare earths more unique is the fact that “no recycling or 
substitution processes for rare earths are currently commercially viable.”79 Also, exploitation 
                                                 
 
77 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012). According to this official paper, in 
Bao Tou, which is China’s most important rare earths mining area, only one-third of the origi-
nal volume of rare earths resources is available. During 20 years, reserve-extraction ratio of 
ion-absorption rare earth mines in China’s southern provinces has reduced by 35%. 
78 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.328 
79 See European Commission (2011) p.12. To a large extent, rare earths are non-substitutable. 
The substitute materials are either not available or not performing well. See Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology (2011) p.4. 
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on new rare earths mine can be quite time consuming and risky.80 All these facts should be 
taken into consideration when weighing the level of rare earths’ shortage now in China. 
Thus, in my opinion, China still have much space to argue if the standard of “critical shortage” 
can be read more in light of natural resources.  
 
3.2.3 “temporarily” 
To explain the term in context of the treaty, the Panel compared Art. XI:2(a) with Art. XX(g), 
which aims to justify natural resources conservation measures. By addressing that, the Panel 
concluded that, in order to distinguish their different reaches, restrictions or bans that can be 
justified under Art. XI:2(a) “must be of a limited duration and not indefinite” 81 and “a fixed 
time-limit”82. Moreover, “temporarily” should be read in combination with “critical shortage.” 
Were certain measure “destined to be in place permanently”, it is difficult to say that the situa-
tion it is supposed to address is a “critical shortage”.83 
Appellate Body confirmed that there exists a requirement for limited duration of time when 
illustrating the definition of “temporarily”. However, in terms of whether the duration has to 
be fixed in advance, Appellate Body disagreed with Panel, opining that “the temporal scope of 
the measures” does not have to be fixed in advance.84 According to the Report, neither the 
length of the measures nor the fact that they are applied in a fixed way counts in evaluating the 
“temporariness”. What matters most to Appellate Body seems to be whether or not the restric-
tions or bans are “applied in the interim, to provide relief in extraordinary conditions in order 
to bridge a passing need.”85  
                                                 
 
80 It is estimated that only 5% of exploration ventures yield a producing mine. See The Par-
liamentary Office of Science and Technology (2011) p.3. 
81 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, para.7.258 
82 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, para.7.255 
83 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, para.7.351 
84 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.331 
85 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.330 
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While the Panel showed its restrictiveness by denying long-term application of measures in 
case of natural resources,86 the Appellate Body confirmed the length of the duration would not 
affect the qualification of the measure at stake. However, the Appellate Body did not specify 
the standard of evaluating “temporarily”, which was criticized for being lack of predictabili-
ty.87 
The disputative export quota mechanism in China  Rare Earths was imposed by China on 
rare earths since 2005.88 The export quota is subject to examination every year, similar to the 
export restriction on refractory-grade bauxite in China  Raw Materials.89 Recalling the Ap-
pellate Report of China  Raw Materials, it has been confirmed that the measure’s length 
would not affect the evaluation, and natural resources can fit in the scope of essential products 
addressed in Art. XI:2(a). The focus point now becomes: Can export quotas on rare earths be 
considered as an interim measure, and thus will finally be withdrawn once there is no longer 
critical shortage in China’s rare earths supply?  
The issue should be viewed against the backdrop of global supply market of rare earths. Al-
though currently China is the biggest supplier of rare earths, this is not always the case. For 
several decades ago, it was the United States that took the first place in global supply market. 
China managed to acquire its leading position in 1990s, through its low-price strategy.90 In 
fact, rare earths element is not that rare and rich in the earth’s crust. The operational mines can 
be found outside China located in United States, India and Australia.91 The reason why China 
is taking control is that it holds much of the expertise related to rare earths exploitation. Also, 
                                                 
 
86 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, para.7.298 
87 Karapinar (2012), pp.450-451. For example, the author pointed out that, by denying the 
Panel’s interpretation of fixed time limit in advance, the unpredictability of the export restric-
tions as such may be exacerbated.  
88 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2011) p.2 
89 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.338. This fact was presented by China 
as an evidence of showing temporariness. However, the Panel didn’t attach much gravity to it.   
90 Trade Policy Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of Japan (2012) p.380 
91 Trade Policy Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of Japan (2012) p.380 
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environmental side effects and exploitation consent problem can be big problems in other 
countries.92  
It is warned that rare earths reserves in China would be exhausted in twenty to thirty years if 
the exploitation cannot be controlled.93 As put above, to a large extent, the shortage of rare 
earths now in China is caused by exploitations activities which are not fully developed world-
wide, no matter out of the reason of environmental protection or difficulties in technology. To 
put it another way, this shortage can be solved, and the export restriction imposed on rare 
earths now can be proved to be a buffering measure, in order to “bridge a passing need” before 
rare earths resource exploitation activities in global level can achieve a breakthrough. The 
measure does not have to be implemented throughout the “life span” of rare earths. That said, 
much evidence is yet needed to prove the measure is actually in place to “prevent” and “re-
lieve” the critical shortage. 
“Temporarily” can be the most difficult standard among the three for China to satisfy. The 
disputable point lies in whether or not China can prove that, firstly, current short supply is due 
to deliberate control of potential productive countries; secondly, final alleviation of current 
short supply is dependent on further exploitation of global rare earths reserves, which is feasi-
ble in foreseeable future.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Art. XI provides the obligations for member states to eliminate export quantitative restrictions, 
which can be derogated under situations stipulated in Art. XI:2(a). Wordings such as “essen-
tial to”, “critical shortage” and “temporarily applied” are decisive standards for evaluating the 
measure.  
In China  Raw Materials, the Appellate Body followed an integrated approach to interpret 
Art. XI:2(a), emphasizing the nexus between these three terms. It held the view that criticality 
is informed by the essentiality of the particular product, while the criticality would inform the 
                                                 
 
92 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2011) p.3 
93 Korinek and Kim (2011) pp.271 
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export measure’s temporariness at the same time.94 Thus it can be concluded, a measure at 
stake will be examined in light of a comprehensive consideration, instead of the three testing 
standard separately.  
As shown in this case, WTO is now adopting a prudent way in applying this provision to ex-
port restriction concerning natural resource product. For example, standards of “critical short-
age” and “temporarily” were interpreted in a restrictive way, thus making it difficult for ex-
porting countries to justify export restrictions imposed on natural resources products. Adjudi-
cative bodies seem to hold the opinion that the exhaustiveness of natural resources is by nature 
contradictive to connotation of “critical shortage” and an “interim measure”. Basically speak-
ing, the interpretation made by adjudicative bodies set a high standard for exporting countries 
to make recourse to in context of natural resources cases.  Due to this attitude, it is even 
thought “global trading patterns in essential raw materials in the coming decade” would prob-
ably be affected.95 Considering the similarity between rare earths and raw materials, China  
Rare Earths may encounter same difficulties when trying to refer to Art. XI:2(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
94 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.328 
95 ICTSD (2012) p.2. Particularly, the article also pointed out that it may affect the heated area 
of rare earths materials, which has been confirmed in that China  Rare Earths has already 
officially brought against China. 
 27 
4 General exceptions clause of GATT 1994: Art. XX 
 
4.1 Overview 
Appellate Body spelled out the primary function of Art. XX in US  Gasoline. It pointed out 
that, “the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, more gen-
erally, to protect the environment” should not be disputable.96 The “importance of coordinat-
ing policies on trade and the environment” has been acknowledged, and reflected in certain 
provisions of Art. XX, which “contains provisions designed to permit important state interests 
— including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources”.97 Moreover, “WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their 
own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental 
objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement”.98 This shows that 
there exists flexibility in taking trade restrictive measures.99  
However, from the beginning, Art. XX has been controversial “because of the divergence of 
national practices in areas listed” in the subsections.100 The problem also lies in the fact that, 
member states’ regulatory autonomy of pursuing non-trade goals should be respected.101 Now 
it has been confirmed in WTO practice that, the autonomy should only be circumscribed “by 
                                                 
 
96 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.29 
97 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.29 
98 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.30 
99 Gary P., Sampson (2005) p.82 
100 Sharp (2010) p.1136 
101 Kapterian (2010) p.90 
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the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agree-
ments.”102 
With regard to China  Rare Earths, Art. XX(g), (b), (i) and (j) among the 10 subsections can 
be resorted to. As early as the GATT era, export restrictions, along with export embargoes and 
charges have been identified as one sort of measures taken on environmental grounds that 
would have impact on international trade directly or indirectly.103 Meanwhile, sector of miner-
als and metals was recognized as of particular interest to developing countries, “in which trade 
may be affected as a result of environmental policy measures.”104 Both Art. XX(g) and (b) can 
be utilized to address environmental concerns105. Art. XX(i) is relevant since natural resource 
issue is at stake in this case, while (j) can be referred to address short supply issues in rare 
earths market. In light of this, evaluation of the export restriction on rare earth needs identify-
ing the national interest and public purpose in a prudent way. 
 
4.2 Art. XX (g) 
 
4.2.1 Application scope 
As can be seen from the text, this provision aims to justify the WTO-illegal measures “relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. In light of this, in China  Rare Earths, 
rare earths fall into the scope with no doubt.  
                                                 
 
102 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.30 
103 GATT(1991) p.36 
104 GATT(1991) p.37 
105 Art. XX(g) and (b) reads as follows: 
“(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; … 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; …” see 
Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1818 
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One more thing is worth noting. There exists another option in terms of choosing “exhaustible 
natural resources”. The Panel confirmed in US  Gasoline that clean air could be considered 
an exhaustible natural resource. It held that, clean air was a resource and it was natural and 
could be depleted at the same time.106 Following this reasoning, water can also be recognized 
as exhaustible natural resources in the same way.  
Production of rare earths is a rather hazardous process, and known for its pollution to land, 
water and air.107 In this sense, China can also justify its export restriction on rare earths by 
claiming clean air and water are the exhaustible natural resources they intend to conserve.  
 
4.2.2 Link between purposes and measures 
Textually, the phrase “relating to” describes the interrelation between the measure under Art. 
XX(g) and the purpose it serves. Apart from this, the term of “made in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption” constitutes another requirement.  
Wordings similar to “relating to” can be found in other subsections of Art. XX, for example, 
“necessary to” and “essential to”.108 In light of this, to probe into the specific meaning of the 
terms requires viewing Art. XX as a whole in the first place, under which different wordings 
should reflect different meanings.109 In the 1987 Herring and Salmon case, the Panel for the 
first time concluded that to qualify “relating to”, the measures “had to be primarily aimed at” 
the objective addressed in Art. XX(g).110 This approach was confirmed in a list of cases since 
then.111 In US  Shrimp, Appellate Body evaluated the relationship between the measure at 
                                                 
 
106 Panel Report, US  Gasoline, para.6.37 
107 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2011) p.3 
108 See Art. XX(b) and (j) respectively. Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1818  
109 Appellate Body expressed the same opinion in US  Gasoline. Appellate Body Report, US 
 Gasoline, pp.17-18 
110 Panel Report, Herring and Salmon, para.4.6 
111 For example, United States  Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, United States  Taxes on 
Automobiles, as well as US  Gasoline. See Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.18. 
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stake and the policy goal “it purports to serve” 112 as “a close and real” one113, then held that 
the standard of “relate to” was thus qualified. 
On the other hand, the term of “in conjunction with” indicates the correlation between domes-
tic measures and the measure at dispute. In US  Gasoline, the Appellate Body pointed out 
that, it is sufficient to read the phrase of “in conjunction with” “quite plainly” as “together 
with” or “jointly with”,114 while emphasizing “the clause is a requirement of even-handedness 
in the imposition of restrictions”115, thus no bias towards domestic products is showed. It also 
held that the word “effective” does not imply “an empirical ‘effects test’”. Before drawing this 
conclusion, the Appellate Body notably considered the particularity of the case related to con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources by stating that, in such cases, it would take long 
time before the effects can be finally observed.116 In recent China  Raw Materials, the Appel-
late Body referred to the analysis in precedents, and appraised the export restrictions imposed 
by China according to above two standards. It pointed out that the Panel “erred in interpreting 
the phrase ‘made effective in conjunction with’…to require a separate showing that the pur-
pose of the challenged measure must be to make effective restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption,”117 and reversed this interpretation thereunder. 
As analyzed in 4.3.1, in China  Rare Earths, both rare earths as such and clean air or water 
can be referred to as exhaustible natural resources. Accordingly, application of “link” standard 
would be analyzed below in context of these two categories respectively.  
Firstly, whether export quota system of rare earths is “primarily aimed at” conserving China’s 
rare earths resource, and whether the measure takes effective “in conjunction with” domestic 
restrictions should be examined. Based on Panel Report of China  Raw Materials, it is ex-
pected that the export restriction on rare earths would receive a thorough evaluation, in terms 
                                                 
 
112 Appellate Body, US  Shrimp, para.137 
113 Appellate Body, US  Shrimp, para.141 
114 Appellate Body, US  Gasoline, p.20 
115 Appellate Body, US  Gasoline, p.21 
116 Appellate Body, US  Gasoline, p.21 
117 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.361 
 31 
of the text, design, architecture and context.118 Since export quota is just a numerical system 
and does not contain much information like laws and regulations, recourse should be made 
more to its design and context. As early as 1991, China began to exercise control in export of 
rare earths resources.119 In 2005, China introduced the export quota on rare earths,120 and has 
been accused of introducing export quota to deal with the decline price of rare earths, which 
was caused by vast outflow of rare earths resources in 1990s.121 Relevant statistics can be ob-
tained from Table 1 below. It can be seen that China’s production quota on rare earths has 
been keeping a relatively steady level throughout the last six years, which seems to show the 
measure at dispute is not helping conserve rare earths somehow. However, China’s policies 
over rare earths industry are now going through a shift. Resource conservation is more and 
more cited by Chinese government in public circumstances.122 It seems that, since the export 
restriction was introduced in rare earths, the measure has gradually transferred from being 
used to control market price at the first beginning to a more comprehensive objective now, of 
which natural resources conservation takes up an important place. Obviously, the alleged new 
policy objective need time to take effect. In this sense, at least from the current situation, it 
remains to see whether or not there exists a “close and real” link between export quota on rare 
earths and conservation purpose. 
                                                 
 
118 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.7.418  
119 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012) 
120 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012) 
121 For example, in the United States, prices for imported Chinese rare earths rose drastically 
from 3,111 dollars in 2002 to 76,239 dollars in 2011. See Morrison and Tang (2012) p.5. 
122 “Policies of China’s rare earth industry” was issued in June 2012. It is the first time for 
Chinese to illustrate in the official paper about its policies on the whole industry systematical-
ly. The white paper listed the severe problems caused by exploitation of rare earth resources, 
such as excessive exploitation, damage to the ecological environment, divergence between 
price and value. More importantly, it presented a series of the industry’s “Fundamental Prin-
ciples”, among which “adhering to environmental protection and resource conservation” ranks 
the first place. See Information Office of the State Council of China (2012). 
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Table 1. China’s Rare Earth Production and Exports, 2006-2011123 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Official 
Chinese 
production 
quota 
86,520 87,020 87,620 82,320 89,200 93,800 
USGS 124 
reported 
production 
119,000 120,000 120,000 129,000 130,000 112,500       
(esti-
mated by 
IMCOA) 
Chinese 
export quota 
61,560 60,173 47,449 50,145 30,259 30,246 
 
Source: China Ministry of Land and Resources. U.S. Geological Survey. Ministry of Com-
merce of China.  
Note: USGS production data exceeded Chinese quotas, some of which is attributed to illegal 
mining. 
 
When applying the standard of “in conjunction with” to China  Rare Earths, it is necessary 
to recall the Appellate Body’s remarks in US  Gasoline, that “even-handedness” should be 
attached great importance.125 It is alleged that, control on domestic mining, processing and 
other procedures related to rare earths were implemented together with export control since 
1991. China also began to exercise total-amount control over domestic exploitation activities 
on rare earths in 2006.126 Table 1 indicates the China’s export quota on rare earths during its 6 
years’ implementation, in comparison to quota imposed on domestic production. From the 
                                                 
 
123 Humphries (2012) p.19 
124 USGS stands for “U.S. Geological Survey”. 
125 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.21 
126 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012) 
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statistics, it can be clearly seen that production remains a steady level compared to the fierce 
cut in rare earths export amount, especially in 2010 which was a striking 40%. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to see how the export restriction is imposed in an even-handedness way.  
Whereas the export quota cannot be justified under the purpose of conserving rare earths, aim 
of conserving clean air and water should be examined under “relating to” as well as “in con-
junction with”. Like natural resources conservation, environmental protection is now frequent-
ly listed as one of the major concerns of China’s rare earths policy on official occasions. Nev-
ertheless, conserving clean air and water seems indicating an over specified goal within the 
wide scope of environmental protection, thus making it difficult to establish its close connec-
tion with export quota on rare earths. To put another way, conserving clean air and water is 
remote from “primary” purpose of the measure at dispute, and the standard of “relating to” is 
therefore not fulfilled.  
In conclusion, even though rare earths export quota fit into the application scope of Art. XX(g), 
and can be argued from the perspective of conserving natural resources as well as clean air or 
water, the measure failed the link test contained in this provision. The purpose of conserving 
natural resources cannot be proved because the measure does not treat domestic market and 
export market in an even way required by “in conjunction with”, while conserving clean air or 
water is too specified for the measure to address.  
 
4.3 Art. XX (b) 
 
4.3.1 Application scope 
To fall into the scope of Art. XX(b), the measures at stake must aim to “protect human, animal 
or plant life or health” in the first place.127 When evaluating the standard, the Panel of EC  
Tariff examined the design, architecture and structure of the alleged illegal regulations by re-
                                                 
 
127 This approach has been confirmed in several cases, such as EC  Tariff Preferences, US  
Gasoline and EC  Asbestos.  
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ferring to the approach adopted by Japan  Alcoholic Beverages II.128 While in EC  Asbestos, 
before drawing the conclusion that the measure was qualified under Art. XX(b), the Panel stu-
died the scientific evidences closely to identify the risk for public health.129 Thus, it is ex-
pected that the alleged policy objective of the measures at stake would be appraised in a very 
comprehensive way.  
Harms caused by rare earths exploitation to environment have been touched upon in sections 
above. These problems can be even severer in China, for most of the production companies 
are small or medium sized enterprises, adopting out-dated technologies.130 Therefore, there 
does exist a risk to public health and ecological environment which is caused by rare earths 
exploitation activities, and the purpose of protecting “human, animal or plant life or health” 
can be preliminary established. Whether or not the export quota on rare earths addresses this 
purpose and serves as a necessary measure at the same time will be appraised under the stan-
dard below.  
 
4.3.2 Link between purposes and measures 
As indicated by the wordings “necessary to”, invoking Art. XX(b) as a justification requires 
the necessity test. In Korea-Various Measures on Beef, Appellate Body illustrated the “neces-
sary” standard as follows: “…the term ‘necessary’ refers…to a range of degrees of necessity. 
At one end of this continuum lies ‘necessary’ understood as ‘indispensable’; at the other end, 
is ‘necessary’ taken to mean as ‘making a contribution to’. We consider that a ‘necessary’ 
measure is…located significantly closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite 
pole of simply ‘making a contribution to’.” 131 This method was later referred to in EC  Tariff 
                                                 
 
128 The Appellate Body made the assertion that “the aim of the measure…can most often be 
discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure.” Appel-
late Body Report, Japan  Alcoholic Beverages II, p.29 
129 Panel Report, EC  Asbestos, pp.337-440 
130 Chinese Society of Rare Earths (2009) 
131 Appellate Body Report, Korea  Beef, para.161 
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Preferences when the Panel addressed the standard of “necessary” under Art. XX(b).132 In 
China  Raw Materials, the Panel adopted the approach when appraising the necessity of the 
measure at stake. By citing Brazil  Retreaded Tyres, it also made clear that, to confirm the 
preliminary conclusion, alternatives suggested by the complainants should be tested. However, 
the feasibility and practicality of the alternative must be taken into account.133  
In accordance with case laws, the measure in China  Rare Earths should be evaluated in as-
pect of its contribution to the justified purpose. At this point, by recalling the Appellate Body 
ruling in Brazil  Retreaded Tyres, the contribution made by certain measure can be evaluated 
on whether it “is apt to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objective”, 
because “certain complex public health or environmental problems maybe tackled only with a 
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures.” 134  
Nowadays, protecting human or plant life or health from pollution of rare earths exploitation 
activities is an imminent task for China. Apart from the harm to surrounding environment 
caused by rare earths exploitation mentioned above, the mining process of light rare earths is 
accompanied by the possible danger caused by radioactive elements, which threatens the sur-
rounding environment and people’s health.135 A large number of cases on pollution due to rare 
earths’ mining have been heavily reported in China, especially in the main mining area of 
northwest and middle China.136 To sum up, the environmental and health problems incurred 
                                                 
 
132 Panel Report,  EC  Tariff Preferences, paras.7.211 
133 Panel Report, China  Raw Materials, paras.7.489-7.493 
134 Appellate Body Report, Brazil  Retreaded Tyres, para.151 
135 Information Office of the State Council of China (2012) 
136 In Baotou, which is China’s primary rare earths’ production city, mass of rare earths’ by-
products have been disposed and piled to form a “rare earths lake” of 170 million ton. A large 
population of people had to move due to the polluted water and environment caused by mining 
activities. Meanwhile, being another main mining area located in middle China, Ganzhou has 
also suffered a lot from the lagging way of exploitation. The destroyed land has reached as 
large as 97.34 square kilometers, and local government had spent 192.8 million RMB in tack-
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by rare earths exploitation is a quite complex one, which need coping with in a comprehensive 
way. In the domestic level, changes have occurred in legislative area of rare earths in recent 
years. In purpose of developing China rare earths industry in a more environmental friendly 
way, various domestic policies have been in place. “China reformed its rare earths quota sys-
tem, introducing additional environmental protection requirements as a prerequisite for receiv-
ing export permits.”137 Policies of raising resource tax rate are now being implemented, and 
resources tax of rare earths in China was raised by nearly 20 times since April 2011. The cor-
respondent tax revenue has been increased by 68% in 2012 compared to last year.138 Policies 
on promoting more severe environmental standards within rare earths industry have also been 
implemented.139 Particularly, enforcement of new standards is reinforced by other government 
sectors’ cooperation. In 2012, enterprises that could not meet new standards have been denied 
export qualifications by Ministry of Commerce.140  
Out of the same objective of above-said domestic measures, export quota imposed on rare 
earths can be considered as the countermeasure of China from international perspectives. In 
China  Rare Earths, most direct impact of export quota would be a sharp decrease in rare 
earths’ export volume and drastic increase in the product’s price in global market. This rise in 
rare earths price can be viewed as reflecting high environmental cost in rare earths production, 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
ling issues on disposed mining hills from 2005 until 2012. see Xinhua Net (2010) and Wang 
(2012). The two cases are just tip of the iceberg. 
137 ICTSD (2012) p.2 
138 Meng (2012) 
139 Ministry of Environmental Protection (2011). The standards entered into force since Octo-
ber 2011. The mandatory industry exit mechanism provided in it requires enterprises that can-
not fulfill the standards within 2 years must exit rare earths industry. Actually, in 2010, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued the draft for ‘Qualifications to Access 
to Rare Earths Industry’, which was the first official document setting access conditions for 
the whole industry. “Environment protection” was listed as one of the qualifications to get 
access into rare earths industry. See Li (2011) 
140 Ministry of Commerce (2011) 
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which is also a frequently cited public policy when other exporting countries impose export 
duties.141 Accordingly, export quota on rare earths is a constitutive part of China’s integrated 
measure concerning environmental and health protection related to rare earths, and should be 
considered as a measure “apt to” make a contribution to the achievement of the justified objec-
tive.   
However, whether export quota at stake is an “indispensable” one needs further evaluation. To 
put another way, is there no other alternative of less restrictiveness can be utilized to achieve 
the same effect? It is believed that, export quota is highly relevant to the international trade 
relations, and prone to be challenged due to its restrictiveness.142 In light of this, two factors 
reflected in China  Rare Earths should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the value at stake 
is a “vital and important” one. As stated above, protection of environment and public health in 
this case is an urgent task and should be highly valued. According to EC  Asbestos, the more 
vital the value is, the easier to prove the measure is a necessary one.143 Secondly, environmen-
tal externality caused by rare earths exploitation can be addressed in domestic measures, such 
as environmental standards attached to exploitation permit and resources tax. Export quota on 
rare earths is thus not irreplaceable in this sense. 
In conclusion, evaluation of the “necessary” standard can be a quite difficult one. On one hand, 
export quota constitutes one important part of China’s oversea strategies in tackling deteriora-
tive environment problem caused by rare earths exploitation. From another, the policy is rather 
disputative due to its restrictiveness. It remains unclear how the Panel would weigh the two 
factors.     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
141 Korinek and Kim (2011) p.264 
142 Song and Zhang (2012) 
143 Appellate Body Report, EC  Asbestos, para.172 
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4.4 Art. XX (i) 
 
4.4.1 Application scope 
The application scope reflected in this provision reads as follows: “…restrictions on exports of 
domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic 
processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the 
world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; …”144  
There is no precedent under GATT/WTO jurisprudence concerning this article. However, in-
ferred from the text, two requirements should be fulfilled for the measure to fall into the scope 
in the first place. Firstly, the “restrictions on exports of domestic materials” should be utilized 
in order to “ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry”. 
Second, the measure should be imposed “during periods when the domestic price” is “held 
below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan.” 
In China  Rare Earths, as mineral natural resource, rare earths qualify for “domestic materi-
al” in the first place. Then the issue whether there exists intention of ensuring essential quanti-
ties of rare earths to China’s processing industry follows. As the world’s biggest developing 
countries, China’s rapid economic growth relies heavily on its prosperous processing and 
manufacturing industries. For example, production of mobile phones, magnets and metal al-
loys are all among China’s profitable industrial areas.145 Apart from this, China is now plan-
ning to promote the use of green energy. According to the “twelfth five-year plan” issued by 
Chinese government, by 2015, use of non-fossil energy should constitute up to 11.4% primary 
energy’s utilization.146 In context of this, rare earths are of great importance to China’s domes-
tic economy, because of its wide application in all these areas. In fact, according to statistics, 
China supplies approximately 95% of global demand and consumes about 60% of the global 
                                                 
 
144 Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1818 
145 Hurst (2010) p.5 
146 State Council of China (2012) 
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supply at the same time.147 Thus in this sense, China is reasonable to utilize export quota as 
measure of ensuring domestic supplies in rare earths.  
Secondly, the timing requirement of “when the domestic price of such materials is held below 
the world price” needs considering. The export quota still has to be examined in terms of its 
application period. In 1990s, China’s mass volumes of export at low prices caused the prices 
of rare earths worldwide to plunge.148 Between 2002 and 2005, it was reported average rare 
earth prices in China dropped to about 5.50 dollars per kilogram, which was a historic low.149 
Export quota was introduced in 2005. In context of the timing of its occurrence, it falls into the 
scope of strategies dealing with unreasonable prices of rare earths in the world market.  
Finally, attention must be paid to the term of “governmental stabilization plan”. Textually, the 
wording implies that the price differences should be attributed to government’s conscious ma-
nipulation instead of invisible hand of market economy. According to local media, deputy 
minister of Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in China recently alleged that 
Chinese government never interfered with market prices of rare earths, and differences be-
tween domestic and global prices might due to different qualities of rare earths product.150 In 
this manner, China seems to deny the existence of “a governmental stabilization plan”. 
Thus export quota failed to satisfy the requirement provided in Art. XX(i) because its imple-
mentation does not constitute part of “government stabilization plan”, and application of Art. 
XX(i) is precluded accordingly. However, since the article has never been interpreted official-
ly, the thesis would move on to the next two issues contained in the provision for discussion 
purpose.   
 
                                                 
 
147 Korinek and Kim (2011) pp.271 
148 Hurst (2010) p.11 
149 Morrison and Tang (2012) p.10 
150 Li (2012) 
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4.4.2 Link between purposes and measures 
Art. XX(i) adopted “involving” as the “link” wording. The dictionary meaning of “involve” is 
to “have or include (something) as a necessary or integral part or result.”151 Compared to other 
similar terms in subsections of Art. XX, such as “necessary to”, “essential to” and “related to”, 
“involving” implies a relatively lower standard. This difference should inform the article’s 
interpretation.152  
Thus in China  Rare Earths, it would suffice to prove that the purpose of ensuring supply 
rare earths to domestic processing industry in China is one necessary part of the intention of 
designing export quota on rare earths. In accordance with case laws, “necessary” can be inter-
preted as “indispensable” and cannot replaced by alternatives. As illustrated in 3.2.1, rare 
earths are considered as “essential” products, and are input to various important industries in 
China, especially manufacturing industries. It can be inferred that the sufficient domestic 
supply in rare earths is decisive to development of processing industry in China. From Table 1 
above, obvious gap between yearly production quota and export quota can be detected, and it 
is argued that the gap is actually reserved for domestic use.153 Moreover, in light of current 
rare earths policies that put great emphasis on natural resources conservation in China, a cut 
on export volumes seem to be an irreplaceable choice to ensure supply to domestic processing 
industry when the whole production quota is held in a stable level and is possible to decrease 
in the near future.  
To sum up, purpose of imposing export quota on rare earths contains a necessary part of en-
suring domestic supply to processing industry in China, and the link requirement is thus ful-
filled.      
 
                                                 
 
151 Oxford dictionary (2012) 
152 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.18 
153 Trade Policy Committee of the Industrial Structure Council of Japan (2012) p.379 
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4.4.3 Requirement on non-discrimination 
Additional requirement can be found in the ending of Art. XX(i): “…Provided that such re-
strictions shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domes-
tic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-
discrimination.” As indicated in this sentence, the standard of non-discrimination under Art. 
XX(i) would be the same as that established by non-discrimination clause of GATT1994, i.e. 
Art. I and  Art. III.154  
In China  Rare Earths, since the issue of competition between China and importing countries 
in domestic market is not relevant to this case, the only related non-discrimination provision 
should be Art. I which provides Most Favored National Treatment. The discussion related to 
discrimination between importing countries in this case would be spelled out in 4.6. To avoid 
repetition it would not be discussed here any more.  
 
4.5 Art. XX (j) 
 
4.5.1 Application scope 
There has been no case brought under this subsection. However, negotiation history of this 
article could be tracked to help clarify its application scope. In 1950s, a Working Party under 
GATT issued opinion on the issue of quantitative restrictions.155 Notwithstanding the report 
mentioned “short supply” several times, it didn’t manage to give a clear explanation on it. Ev-
er since then, neither “shortages” nor “essential” has been brought out and elaborated on. 
Given that specific elaboration on the text as such cannot be found in GATT/WTO’s official 
documents or relevant precedents, in accordance with Vienna Convention on Law of Trea-
                                                 
 
154 Wordings similar to “afforded to such domestic industry” can also be found in Art. III:1. 
155 GATT (1950). The Working Party was set up by request of Czechoslovakia, claiming that 
the United States’ Marshall Plan violated Art. XI. It was the only time that “CONTRACTING 
PARTY or subsequent WTO member” attempted to refer to Art. XX(j) as a justification for its 
measures in dispute. see Sharp (2010) p.260 
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ties156, negotiation history of the article proper worth being taken into account. Original text of 
Art. XX (j) first emerged in the report of Preparatory Committee to International Trade Organ-
ization in 1946. It illustrated that, during a post-war transitional period, quantitative restric-
tions should be allowed to use in order “to achieve the equitable distribution of products in 
short supply...” together with other two situations.157  In 1947, the suggestion was made into a 
general exception to GATT obligations. It was incorporated in Art. XX and titled “Part II(a)”. 
Notwithstanding the “sunset provision”158 attached to Art. XX, this subsection was able to be 
extended during the following years. In 1957, Part II(a) finally became Art. XX(j) through the 
Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement.159  
To sum it up, the text of this subsection derives from the worries during post-war period on 
products’ short supply. In case general or local short supply may occur thereafter, the subsec-
tion is kept over the years to justify the quantitative restrictions taken under such situations. 
Read with “products” jointly, the situation of “short supply” seems can be applied in a wide 
range, including foodstuffs, raw materials, and so on. 
In light of this, as it has been proved in 3.2.1, rare earths are essential products in “critical 
shortage” now in China, thus no doubt qualified for the wider standard of “shortage” ad-
dressed in Art.  XX(j). 
                                                 
 
156 According to Art. 32, the preparatory work of the treaty may be considered as supplemen-
tary means of interpretation under certain circumstances. Global and Regional Treaties 2010 
(2010) p.30 
157 The other two situations included: “…the orderly maintenance of war-time  
price control by countries undergoing shortages as a result of the war, and the orderly liquida-
tion of temporary surpluses of government-owned stocks and of industries…” However, these 
two situations were removed in a review session in 1955. See WTO (2012)b pp.592-593. 
158 It was provided in Part II of Art. XX that, “Measures instituted or maintained under part II 
of this Article which are inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement shall be re-
moved as soon  as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased, and in any event not later 
than January 1, 1951…”See WTO (2012)b p.593. 
159 WTO (2012)b p.593 
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4.5.2 Link between purposes and measures 
Under this standard, the measure at stake should be an “essential” one to the acquisition or 
distribution of the products in shortage. As illustrated in 4.4.2, in China  Rare Earths, export 
quota is an indispensable measure to ensure the domestic supply of rare earths in China, which 
also indicates the essentialness of the measure. Accordingly, export quota on rare earths satis-
fies the standard of “essential to”. 
 
4.5.3 General principle: equitable access  
It is required under this subsection that “such measures shall be consistent with the principle 
that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such 
products.” Textually, the standard implies that, equitable access to the product in short supply 
should be ensured among all member states. It can also be further inferred that, fairness should 
be kept between all importing countries and between importing countries and the exporting 
country per se as well. To put another way, the implementation of the disputed measure can-
not lead to differential accesses to the product in shortage.  
As mentioned above, export quota in China  Rare Earths caused the gap between production 
quota and export quota, which is accused of being reserved for domestic use. In addition, it is 
widely recognized that the fierce cut down on export volume due to export quota leads to dras-
tic increase in price of rare earths in global market since 2005. In light of this, rare earths ex-
port quota imposed by China has not only restricted importing countries’ access to the product, 
but also restricted them from obtaining rare earths at prices similar to domestic purchasers.  
In conclusion, export quota on rare earths fails to prove itself to be a measure implemented 
under the principle of equitable access, thus cannot be justified under Art. XX(j). However, I 
would proceed with discussing for completeness purpose. 
 
4.5.4 Timing requirement  
Last standard contained in this subsection is about duration of the measure. According to the 
text, the measure “shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have 
ceased to exist.”  
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By nature, this sentence expresses similar meaning to “temporarily” provided in Art. XI:2(a), 
in that it also indicates the requirement of a limited duration in implementing the measure at 
dispute. However, no additional criteria such as “prevent or relieve” is attached. Compared to 
Art. XI:2(a), “ceased to exist” seems to imply a broader scope of reasons that lead to an end of 
product shortage, and effort of the exporting country is not a mandatory prerequisite when 
applying this provision. Effect of the measure is not emphasized either.  
When applying this provision to export quota imposed on natural resources product, condi-
tions that cause the shortage of rare earths should be clarified in the first place. To justify its 
export quota, China can refer to incomplete exploitation of rare earths resources worldwide, 
and accordingly, allege that the export quota would remain to exist until the proliferation of 
exploitation activities in other countries lead to final alleviation of the shortage. 
 
4.6 Chapeau160 
It has been confirmed in a list of precedents that chapeau of Art. XX constitutes the second 
test once the measure in dispute can be justified under certain subsections in Article XX. Ap-
pellate Body elaborated on this two-tier test in US  Gasoline by stating that, “the measure at 
issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions…it must also satis-
fy the requirements imposed by the opening clause of Article XX.”161  
                                                 
 
160 Chapeau of Art. XX reads as follows: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of meas-
ures: …” see Global and Regional Treaties 2010 (2010) p.1818 
161 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.22 
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The chapeau was elaborated in a series of WTO cases, for example, US  Gasoline, US  
Shrimp, EC  Tariff, Brazil  Treaded Tyres, etc. Its purpose was considered as preventing the 
abuse of exceptions in Article XX, which was confirmed by the negotiation history.162  
 
4.6.1 “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” 
“Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” is one of the two different violations under chapeau. 
Three elements in determining the discrimination were confirmed as follows: “First, the appli-
cation of the measure must result in discrimination…Second, the discrimination must be arbi-
trary or unjustifiable in character…Third, this discrimination must occur between countries 
where the same conditions prevail.”163 In aspect of defining the term “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination”, the Appellate Body of US  Gasoline made recourse to treaty interpretation 
provisions in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and drew the conclusion that this 
standard “must be different from” that stipulated in Art. III: 4.164   
In accordance with case laws, firstly, whether there exists discrimination in applying export 
quota to rare earths should be examined. By recalling US  Shrimp, it is confirmed that “such 
discrimination could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between 
exporting Members and the importing Members concerned.” Accordingly, discrimination 
which would lead to different treatment between exporting countries and importing country as 
such in importing country’s domestic market would also fall into the scope of chapeau. How-
ever, it does not mean that discrimination between importing members and exporting member 
per se satisfies the discrimination provided in chapeau in the same way. This is because the 
discrimination scope established in US  Shrimp and US  Gasoline was meant to include the 
                                                 
 
162 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.22 and Appellate Body Report, US  Shrimp, 
para.157.  
163 Appellate Body Report, US  Shrimp, para.150 
164 WTO Analytical Index (2012) p.311 
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connotation of national treatment,165 which is of no relevance in China  Rare Earths. There-
fore, it would suffice to examine if there exists discrimination between all export destinations 
for China rare earths. 
Top 5 export destinations of China’s rare earths are: Japan (66%), the United States (7%), 
France (6%), Germany (5%) and Hong Kong (4%).166 Although the five countries and areas 
take up different shares, export quota allocation is decided annually and imposed in a general 
and objective way, with no designation for specific destinations.  
Thus, the export quota on rare earths is not a measure falling into discrimination scope prohi-
bited by chapeau. 
 
4.6.2 “a disguised restriction on international trade” 
In US  Gasoline, the Appellate Body interpreted the term in light of “arbitrary or unjustifia-
ble discrimination”, and held that a measure of “disguised restriction” should be read as “arbi-
trary or justifiable discrimination” with the disguise of a justified form under Art. XX. Accor-
dingly, the conclusion that there exists no formal discrimination in applying export quota to 
rare earths should be reevaluated to confirm that there is no discrimination de  facto in China 
 Rare Earths either. 
In 2011, China for the first time allocated quotas to qualified companies, particularly, the quo-
tas were further split into light and medium-heavy rare earths. And according to the first-round 
announced quotas, light rare earths take up over 87% of the total volume.167 However, com-
pared to the general allocation in the past, this new classification on export quota reflects no 
hidden discrimination. Both light and medium-heavy rare earths have their scopes of applica-
                                                 
 
165 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.24.  In the appeal, the United States proceeded 
on the assumption that the discrimination standards set in chapeau “were relevant to a case of 
national treatment where the Panel had found a violation of Article III:4.” The assumption was 
confirmed by the Appellate Body.  
166 Morrison and Tang (2012) p.6 
167 Morrison and Tang (2012) p.18 
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tion respectively168 and required worldwide to a similar extent. Therefore, export quota on rare 
earths does not constitute discrimination de facto. 
In conclusion, export quota in China  Rare Earths can be justified under requirement implied 
in chapeau of Art. XX. 
 
4.7 Final clarifications: connection with Art. XI:2(a) 
Due to similar wordings and functions, certain subsections under Art. XX and Art. XI:2(a) 
seem overlap each other in a way. In China  Raw Materials, the adjudicative bodies re-
marked169 this interrelation and made clarifications. After elaborating all possible justifications 
under Art. XX, these clarifications deserve to be mentioned.  
The Panel drew a line between Art. XX(g) and Art. XI:2(a) when addressing the term “tempo-
rarily” in Art. XI:2(a). The Appellate Body confirmed this opinion, and restated their different 
functions, which is, “Art. XI:2(a) addresses measures taken to prevent or relieve ‘critical 
shortages’ of foodstuffs or other essential products” while Art. XX(g) targeted “measures re-
lating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”.170 According to the Appellate 
Body, the two articles should be resorted to under different circumstances. Nevertheless, it 
does not preclude the possibility that the measure in dispute can qualify the two articles simul-
taneously, thus addressing two different purposes.171 
Relation between Art. XX(j) and Art. XI:2(a) is also touched upon in China  Raw Materials. 
In comparison to “products in…short supply” provided in Art. XX(j), Art. XI:2(a) adopted the 
wording “critical shortage”, in connection with “foodstuffs” and “other products essential to 
the exporting contracting party.” Accordingly, Appellate Body drew the conclusion that Art. 
                                                 
 
168 The light rare earths are widely applied in producing hybrid engines, metal alloys, electron-
ic appliances as well as magnets. The heavy ones are generally used in high tech applications. 
See Hurst (2010) p.3 and Humphries (2012) p.3. 
169 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.25 
170 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.337 
171 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.337 
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XI:2(a) sets a relatively strict application scope compared to Art. XX(j).172 In terms of the log-
ic relation, Art. XX(j) can serve as a second recourse when quantitative restrictions under Art. 
XI cannot be justified by exceptional situations provided therein. 
 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
Generally speaking, Art. XX can be considered as the WTO’s unique way to cope with issues 
outside the trade area. The Appellate Body has been able to “operationalize these provisions to 
provide members with policy space for non-WTO concerns.”173 Its application generally re-
flected the conflict between trade relations and national interests. The troublesome part lies in 
the diversity of national interests. 
Among these exceptions, Art. XX(b) and (g) particularly deal with trade measures that have 
environmental implications. Judging from the available cases, these two articles are most fre-
quently referred to in cases where respondents defend themselves on basis of policy objectives 
related to environment protection as well as natural resource conservation. Practices in this 
area have thus been well developed.  
Considering China  Rare Earths’ similarities to China  Raw Materials, export measure in 
dispute is expected to be tested again on their compatibilities with (b), (g) as well as chapeau 
of GATT 1994. Apart from these 2 subsections, Art. XX(i) also seems appropriate to be re-
ferred to, in that rare earths products are usually closely related to market supply issues. This 
thesis also shed light upon Art. XX(j), in consideration of its similarity to Art. XI:2(a).  
However, China  Rare Earths has its own salient characteristics. Firstly, rare earths are raw 
materials that have strategic meaning. They are crucial to various industries, especially new 
technology application area. Secondly, the market of rare earths featured by its volatility in 
price. Third, China’s export restrictions imposed on rare earths has been implemented for 7 
years, and going through a shifting period recently. New policies and regulations have already 
been issued or being studied, most of which are related to public purpose like protecting envi-
                                                 
 
172 Appellate Body Report, China  Raw Materials, para.325 
173 The WTO and Global Governance: Future Directions (2008) p.49 
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ronment and human health, conserving natural resources etc. To sum up, export restrictions on 
rare earths can be discussed from many different angles due to the issue’s complexity. In con-
text of this, there exists much space for both sides of China  Rare Earths to argue. 
Under the framework of GATT/WTO, what is questionable is the lawfulness of the measures 
chosen by countries, not the policy objectives as such. As can be seen from WTO practices, a 
typical interpretation process in a report always starts with the ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, 
it seems that the Appellate Body tends to adopt a broad way of interpretation, making the ex-
ception clauses more effective,174 even though the decisions always turn to be no surprise. On 
one hand, diversified policy goals would cause difficulties when exporting countries attempt 
to resort to exceptions under Art. XX. From the other, according to World Trade Report 2007, 
how to “distinguish between legitimate public policy and protectionism in the design and use 
of domestic policies” is the core challenge faced by current GATT/WTO system.175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
174 Appellate Body Report, US  Gasoline, p.22 and Appellate Body Report, US  Shrimp, 
para.156. 
175 WTO (2007) p.xxviii. See also Kapterian (2010) p.89. 
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5 Conclusion 
Except for export duties, export restrictions are generally prohibited in GATT 1994. Justifica-
tions are provided in forms of general exceptions as well as more specialized ones. However, 
resorting to these provisions can be challenging, especially in context of natural resources 
trade. To make clarification on its application in such cases, China  Rare Earths was chosen 
and discussed under available exceptions.  
By way of recalling GATT/WTO precedents, crucial terms in these provisions are restated and 
analyzed in light of China  Rare Earths. As the focal point in this case, rare earths are of 
great importance, widely applied, exhaustible, and can be quite problematic from the perspec-
tive of sustainable development. As can be seen from the main body, certain difficulties are 
identified when applying exceptions to export restrictions on rare earths. To some extent, rare 
earths can be viewed as a typical type of a series of strategic raw materials that share common 
characteristics. These difficulties also reflect issues that exporting countries may encounter in 
future practices related to imposing export restrictions on other strategic materials.  
From the perspective of application, Art. XI:2(a) is not a frequently cited provision in 
GATT/WTO. The three standards of “essential to”, “critical shortage” and “temporarily” 
should be read as an integrated part. In accordance with reasoning presented in Appellate 
Body Report of China  Raw Materials, most disputable point in applying this provision in 
China  Rare Earths remains to be justifying the measure at dispute in light of natural re-
sources’ characteristics. This thesis holds the opinion that, considering the status of rare earths 
exploitation activities worldwide, China should refer to this provision and defend itself. 
Art. XX provides more options for exporting countries. Among the 10 subsections, (b), (g), (i) 
and (j) are exceptions that deserve to be considered in China  Rare Earths. Art. XX(i) and (j) 
are precluded for being utilized as justifications, while (b) and (g) are two potential provisions 
that can be considered. However, the justification process can be quite tricky, because certain 
national interests should be evaluated against the free trade value, which is a big issue facing 
adjudicative bodies as well as all member states in WTO framework. 
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One more thing is worth noticing. It should be kept in mind that discussion concerning China 
 Rare Earths in this thesis has precluded impact of accession protocol. In context of this, ap-
plication of existing exception provisions in this case may be relatively broad in comparison to 
China  Raw Materials. 
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